The rise of Bolsonaro from the perspective of social and political psychology
- Alexsandro Alves de Araujo
- Jul 27
- 9 min read
Alexsandro Araujo
The process of Jair Bolsonaro’s rise to the presidency of the Republic cannot be understood in a simplistic manner or solely through the formal channels of institutional politics. It constitutes a complex phenomenon involving the interweaving of collective emotions, symbolic manipulation of the masses, the advance of religious conservatism, and the fragility of democratic institutions in Brazil.
Between 2016 and 2018, the country witnessed a process of increasing political and social polarization, which began with the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and deepened during an electoral campaign marked by irrationality and the mass dissemination of disinformation. Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, approved on August 31, 2016, with 61 votes in favor and 20 against in the Senate, is regarded by many as an institutional rupture lacking sufficient evidence of a crime of responsibility. Although the legal narrative was grounded in technical aspects such as the so-called “fiscal pedaling,” the political nature of the process exposed the strategic use of the crisis to remove the Workers’ Party from power and pave the way for a rightward shift.
Then Vice President Michel Temer assumed office, initiating a transition that would culminate in Bolsonaro’s election. The decision to allow Dilma to run for public office in the future contradicts the argument that her removal was based on the Clean Record Law (Lei da Ficha Limpa), suggesting a political maneuver rather than a strictly legal one.
"Organized masses have always played a significant role in the life of nations; but this role has never been as important as it is today." — Le Bon, 2013, p. 3.
In the vacuum left by the discrediting of traditional politics, a figure emerges who embodies anti-politics, order, and conservative morality: Jair Bolsonaro. His rise, however, is not an isolated phenomenon. It is situated within a broader context of global instability, economic crisis, the rise of right-wing populism, and the radicalization of the masses.
"The unconscious action of the masses, which replaces the conscious activity of individuals, is one of the main characteristics of the present age." — Le Bon, 2013, p. 3.
The masses are governed by irrational impulses, collective emotions, and symbolic suggestions. The charismatic leader does not require rational arguments, but rather images, catchphrases, common enemies, and promises of redemption (Le Bon, 2013, p. 5).
In Brazil in 2018, such a leader found fertile ground among those who, disillusioned with politics and seduced by the idea of “cleansing the country,” began to act collectively under the impulse of a social unconscious fueled by fake news, historical resentments, and hate speech.
The 2018 elections took place amid the widespread dissemination of fake news through social media platforms and messaging apps, particularly WhatsApp. Disinformation became a tool for manipulating collective emotions, fueling a cultural war against public universities, teachers, artists, and social movements. Polarization intensified to such an extent that the public sphere became dominated by simplistic dichotomies such as “leftist lunatics” (esquerdopatas) and “Bolsominions,” rendering rational dialogue virtually impossible.
As Le Bon stated, “institutions and laws are the manifestation of the soul, the expression of its needs” (Le Bon, 2013, p. 2), and therefore, when collective irrationality takes hold, these institutions lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the masses.
Furthermore, Le Bon (2013) argues that:
“The masses possess only the power to destroy,” acting like “microbes that trigger the dissolution of weakened bodies.” — Le Bon (2013, p. 8)
This helps explain why, despite his anti-democratic statements, violent rhetoric, and an inconsequential parliamentary record, Jair Bolsonaro was elected President of the Republic: he spoke the symbolic and emotional language of the masses (Le Bon, 2013).
In this context, religion played a central role. As Burity (2024) analyzes, the phenomenon of the “minoritization” of evangelicals, their rise as an active political force and their attempt to become a “public religion”, was essential to the consolidation of Bolsonarism. Over the course of four decades, evangelical leaders gradually approached political power, culminating in the formation of the so-called “Bible caucus.”
Burity (2024) emphasizes that the emergence of the evangelical caucus in the 1986 elections was a pivotal moment for the institutional political engagement of evangelicals. This period marked the activation of “the political” within Brazilian society, as evangelicals began to claim space in the public sphere, particularly in the wake of redemocratization.
It is important to highlight that the current opposition between evangelical sectors and left-wing parties, particularly the Workers’ Party (PT), has not always been a constant in Brazilian politics. During Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s two presidential terms (2003–2010), the government received significant support from evangelical segments, including the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. The selection of José Alencar, a businessman affiliated with the Liberal Party and connected to conservative sectors, as vice president, reveals the pragmatic nature of this alliance. As Burity (2024) observes, this period was marked by a relative coexistence between the government’s social agenda and the interests of the evangelical field.
However, beginning in 2010, with the advancement of progressive agendas such as the decriminalization of abortion, drug legalization, and the recognition of diverse gender identities and sexual orientations, this religious group began to distance itself from the left. Moral conservatism, which had previously coexisted with economic progressivism, became radicalized, repositioning evangelicals as a political force antagonistic to progressive causes. According to Burity (2024), the rise of global conservatism, combined with internal political tensions, contributed to the strengthening of the evangelicals’ political identity in Brazil. Their support for Jair Bolsonaro and estrangement from Dilma Rousseff’s administration consolidated the evangelical field as a significant actor in the national political arena.
This shift marks the transformation of evangelicals into a pole of resistance against civil rights agendas, consolidating the religious field as a central actor in the strengthening of what Burity (2024) calls the “evangelical-capitalist resonance machine”—an alliance between conservative religious and economic interests. The Dilma government’s resistance to accommodating conservative moral demands generated friction with the evangelical caucus, then led by Eduardo Cunha, which ultimately contributed to the controversial impeachment process of the president
Evangelical moral conservatism found in Jair Bolsonaro a spokesperson for its core agendas, such as opposition to abortion, sexual education in schools, LGBTQIA+ rights, and the secular nature of the State. This alignment gave rise to a new religious populist narrative that claimed to represent the “Christian majority”, morally superior and destined to “save the nation” (Burity, 2024, pp. 16–18).
However, Burity (2024) warns of the ambiguous nature of this religious protagonism.
On the one hand, evangelicals positioned themselves as an alternative to the left and to hegemonic Catholicism; on the other hand, they absorbed the vices of traditional politics, such as patronage, clientelism, and corruption. The evangelical political bricolage, based on improvisation and moralizing performance, reproduced the patterns of the Brazilian political system, thereby emptying the ethical content it claimed to represent (Burity, 2024, p. 18)Segundo o autor, os evangélicos “vão ser fisiológicos, corruptos, venais. Vão fazer o jogo da política com todos os vícios da cultura política brasileira” Burity (2024, p. 18).
Public universities and professors, historically associated with social critique, have come to be demonized by this new ideological field. As a result, budget cuts and anti-intellectual rhetoric have threatened both knowledge production and social mobility through education. Cultural hegemony is no longer contested through argumentation, but rather through attacks on institutions and on academic freedom. Critical education and freedom of teaching have been undermined by a “practical consciousness” devoid of reflection, favoring a functional, technical knowledge with no commitment to autonomous thought.
Le Bon (2013) had already warned that:
“The masses are incapable of holding any opinions other than those imposed upon them,” and “they are not led by rules based on pure theoretical justice, but by whatever can impress and seduce them.” — Le Bon (2013, p. 9).
Bolsonarism, therefore, can be interpreted as a mass phenomenon, a form of political religiosity, and a reflection of Brazil’s deep social contradictions. More than an isolated historical figure, Bolsonaro represents a collective projection, an expression of the national political unconscious, marked by resentment, intolerance, and a yearning for order. As a mirror, he reflects the shadows of a society that has yet to break with authoritarianism, prejudice, and the logic of exclusion.
Overcoming this cycle requires, above all, breaking with the binary logic of politics, which reduces everything to the antagonism between left and right. It is necessary to recover the possibility of dialogue, attentive listening, and constructive criticism. Above all, it is essential to rethink democracy as a project of ethical, social, and political formation, one in which the masses are not merely led, but become active subjects of social transformation.
Final Considerations
The rise of Jair Bolsonaro to power represented more than an electoral victory; it symbolized the mobilization capacity of unconscious forces within the masses, as described by Le Bon (2013). Bolsonarism did not emerge from a well-defined political program, but rather from an instinctive identification with an emotional, symbolic, and moralizing discourse that captured diffuse affections, fears, and resentments in a socially fragile context.
Evangelical Protestant religiosity—particularly within the Pentecostal sphere—played a pivotal role in this process by positioning itself as the legitimate representative of a “Christian people” allegedly threatened by cultural transformations and progressive advances.
Religious leaders, acting as unconscious psychologists of the popular soul, in line with Le Bon’s definition (2013, p. 9), skillfully manipulated the diffuse sentiments of the evangelical population. Anchored in an imaginary of spiritual and moral warfare, these leaders identified symbolic enemies—communism, gender ideology, globalism, intellectualism—and channeled collective fear toward a messianic figure who promised to restore order.
In this regard, support for Bolsonarism was not merely the result of political rationality, but rather of an emotional and symbolic seduction of the masses.
According to Burity (2024), the “minoritisation” of evangelicals has evolved into a form of public religion, endowed with the capacity to contest cultural, political, and moral hegemony in Brazil. However, what presents itself as a moral reaction and a redemptive mission for the nation often conceals an opportunistic alliance with the far right—an alliance marked by the reproduction of traditional political structures and the incorporation of systemic vices.
As Le Bon (2013) warned, the masses are not guided by theoretical justice, but by whatever impresses them; not by institutions, but by symbols that reinforce their identity and worldview.
The Brazilian case confirms that when the edifice of a civilization begins to crumble, “it is always the masses that bring it down” (Le Bon, 2013, p. 8). And when these masses align with performative religious discourses and charismatic leaders, they become powerful instruments of institutional rupture.
If evangelicals have become protagonists in the national political arena, it is because they have understood, or intuitively grasped, the collective soul of their flock, shaping it according to strategic interests.
In light of these reflections, it becomes evident that although the Workers’ Party government was frequently accused—especially by its opponents—of manipulating the masses through social assistance and redistributive programs, Bolsonarism introduced an even more insidious modality of mass control. It is a form of populism that not only mobilizes the popular imagination but also instrumentalizes religion as a sophisticated technology of symbolic and emotional power. In this context, drawing on Le Bon (2013), the leader does not need to present a rational or coherent societal project; it is enough to embody, through simple images and catchphrases, the deepest affections and most archaic fears of a collective in crisis.
Ultimately, for democracy to be strengthened, it is urgent to understand, as Le Bon (2013) proposed, that it is not enough to legislate based on theoretical reason—it is necessary to reach the hearts of the masses. And this will only be possible through critical education, the reinforcement of institutions, and an openness to plural dialogue, including with religious sectors, without yielding to moralizing populism or the manipulation of emotions. Education, though under attack, remains the most powerful space for shaping consciousness capable of resisting authoritarian seductions and collective brutalization.
References
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LE BON, Gustave. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Translated by E. L. de Souza Campos. Niterói: Editora Teodoro, 2013.
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